By Niel
Wijethilaka and K. Govindan
Kalutara and Kandy 14.04.2012
More than 5,000 people packed Colombo’s Sugathadasa stadium for the
inaugural conference of the Peratugami
Samajawadi Pakshaya (Frontline Socialist Party – FSP) on 9 April 2012. Most
were members and sympathisers of this new Left party – a breakaway from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples’
Liberation Front – JVP); but many representatives of other radical Left
parties, Left intellectuals, and progressive social activists were also in
attendance. The emergence and consolidation of the FSP is an important and
hopeful development for the revival of peoples’ movements in Sri Lanka in the
post-war era, following decades of retreat of the labour and left movements.
Underlining the internationalism of the new party, and its understanding
of the relationship between national and global struggles against capitalism,
the Convention was dominated by speeches and messages from international guests
and representatives of FSP branches in England, France and Italy. Greetings
were also delivered by Left groups within Sri Lanka, mainly of Trotskyist and
Maoist lineage, including Vickramabahu Karunarathne on behalf of the Nava Sama Samaja Party.
A ‘Party for Us’ announced the new party in a poster and social media
campaign in the weeks leading up the Convention, showcasing images of the poor
and exploited – of different classes, occupations and ethnicities, who are
unrepresented in the present political system.
Currently, the working class movement is passive and its traditional
leadership are unwilling to challenge the government on the unbearable cost of
living and the pillaging of workers savings to service government debt and
stimulate the stock market. The number of strikes and workers on strike has
sharply declined to only 8 recorded strikes in 2009, with only 5,320 workers
involved in contrast to 52 strikes of over 200,000 workers in 2006.
The governmental Left is palpably weaker in policy influence than in
previous coalitions and unable to even moderate the authoritarian capitalism of
the Rajapakse government. The organised Left outside the government has
declined numerically and in social weight and is struggling to regenerate
itself. While there have been some significant social struggles of free trade
zone workers, university teachers, and fisher-folk in the past year, these have
been short-lived episodes with only partial defensive gains at best.
Abductions
overshadow Convention
The excitement of an impressively organised and staged launch was
overshadowed by the abduction of two leading members of the new party on the
eve of its Convention; in a transparent attempt to sabotage the event and to sow
disarray and confusion in its ranks.
Premakumar Gunarathnam and Dimuthu Attygala were abducted in two
separate incidents within hours of each other, following a pre-Convention
meeting of the leadership on 7 April. Their party was unequivocal in holding
the state responsible for the abductions and in expressing the widespread
sentiment that it was a prelude to their extra-judicial killing, as has been
the despicable trend in Sri Lanka.
In an unprecedented development, Gunarathnam and Attygala were both
released from captivity on 10 April. Their safe release is only due to the broad
and diverse political coalition that protested against their abduction within
Sri Lanka, the diplomatic pressure of the Australian government, and an
international solidarity campaign that was swiftly organised including through
the Fourth International.
Splits within JVP
Late last year the media began carrying
reports of a major split within the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which has been Sri Lanka’s largest Left party
(although many Sri Lankan leftists object to characterising it as socialist
because of its Sinhala nationalist stance on the Tamil national question).
The JVP’s roots are in the Maoist Ceylon
Communist Party in the late 1960s and its membership and supporters are drawn
from the Sinhala rural and semi-urban petty-bourgeoisie. Its central leader,
Rohana Wijeweera, was expelled from the CCP-Peking and formed his own secretive
organisation which led two armed insurrections against the Sri Lankan state in
1971 and later in 1987, which were brutally crushed with the loss of tens of
thousands of young lives. In the second insurrection, all but one member of its
leadership was physically eliminated.
In the early 1990s, the JVP revived its organisation and entered electoral
politics. As the bourgeois populist Sri Lanka Freedom Party adopted the
neoliberal policies of the right-wing United National Party after forming a new
government in 1994, the JVP became the beneficiary of social and political
discontent and a pole of attraction to radical students and young workers. Its
parliamentary caucus grew from 1 member in 1994, to 10 in 2000 and 16 in 2001,
and peaked at 39 (in the 225 seat legislature) in 2004. It also made
significant gains among organised workers especially in the state and private
sector, often through poaching members from rival unions; while also dominating
politics in universities through its militant student unions which were not
averse to using violence and ragging to exert its authority over the
administration and students alike.
However, the JVP faced two ways: it presented itself as an
anti-imperialist and an anti-capitalist force struggling for socialist
revolution in Sri Lanka, while simultaneously projecting itself as a patriotic
nationalist organisation rooted in Sinhala Buddhist culture and committed to
the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the country.
As former general-secretary of the JVP, Lionel Bopage – who also pushed
in the late 70s and early 80s for his party to recognise the existence of Tamil
national oppression and to support the Tamil struggle for equality and justice
– commented: “Since the late 1990s the JVP not only supported the chauvinist
verbal onslaught against the Tamil people but also became an active
collaborator in the brutal repression carried out by the state against the
Tamil people. Thus,
it has to bear some responsibility for the socio-cultural and economic outcomes
that the working people of the island are experiencing today. For dividing the
people by clouding its consciousness, the JVP, in particular its nationalist
bloc used chauvinist and fundamentalist slogans to the maximum effect. The JVP
camouflaged its ultra nationalist stance with socialist phraseology”.
The JVP have been virulently opposed to any proposals for power-sharing
with the Tamil nation. It was a bitter critic of the draft 2000 Constitution,
the political proposals debated during the Cease-Fire Agreement (between 2002
and 2005), and withdrew from the All-Party Representative Committee process on constitutional
reforms. It even continues to oppose the 13th Amendment to the
Constitution that introduced limited devolution of powers to the regions,
despite contesting elections for and being represented in those provincial
councils.
The JVP were vocal supporters of the war and of the use of military
force to suppress the LTTE. In their view, the division of the island through
creation of an independent Tamil homeland (‘Tamil Eelam’) would benefit US
imperialism and Indian ‘expansionism’ in the region. The logical political
conclusion of this perspective was to form alliances with the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP)-led government that was prosecuting the war.
Thus, the JVP – like the ‘Old Left’ Lanka Sama Samaja Party and
Communist Party of Sri Lanka decades before it – succumbed to the pressure of
‘coalition politics’ (popular frontism) by aligning itself with the SLFP, first
by joining the Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga government in 2004, and later
by vigorously supporting the election of her successor Mahinda Rajapakse in 2005.
As the flawed ‘peace process’ and full-blown war broke out after August 2006,
the JVP mobilised Sinhala society in warmongering. The government even arranged
for the JVP parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa to regularly address soldiers at
the battle-front, in a morale-boosting exercise.
This twin policy of collaborating with the neoliberal governments of
Kumaratunga and Rajapakse as well as its non-differentiation from the Sinhala
chauvinist campaign against Tamil rights sparked an internal debate within the
JVP on its revolutionary socialist identity.
Chauvinist split
in 2008
Hidden from public view, the different viewpoints were partially
revealed when the camp around the Sinhala chauvinist Weerawansa broke with the
party and joined the Rajapakse coalition in April 2008, along with 10 other JVP
parliamentarians. The JVP lost its most charismatic public speaker along with a
front organisation of Buddhist monks and laity that was in the vanguard of
agitation against political resolution of the national question.
At the time, Weerawansa revealed that there was a group within the party
that wanted it to rethink its political positions, including on the Tamil
question, and warned darkly of ‘Trotskyist’ deviations.
This was clearly an exodus of the Sinhala nationalist bloc within the
JVP. It allowed the JVP to reassert its political independence from the
Rajapakse regime. In fact, soon after the end of the war in mid-2009, the JVP
in an about-turn began demanding the end of emergency rule, the repeal of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, speedy rehabilitation and release of LTTE
combatants and Tamil political prisoners, and for respect for democratic and
human rights. It also repositioned itself as a bitter critic of the Rajapakse
regime but without any self-criticism of its own past political record of
support.
The debate continued within the JVP as a group of dissidents attempted
to win the traditional leadership of the party over. It was only in August
2011, when it became clear to the dissidents that there was no democratic space
for them within the JVP that they took the decisive step of forming a public
faction known as the Jana Aragala
Vyaparaya (Movement for Peoples Struggle – MPS).
The dissidents began at a disadvantage. They were mainly second generation
leaders recruited in the student movement in the course of the 1990s for e.g.
Pubudu Jagoda, Chameera Koswatta, Waruna Deepthi Rajapaksa, Duminda Nagamuwa
and others. The older members such as Senadheera Gunatilleke were only known
within the party and unknown to the general public as the JVP has generally
projected its parliamentarians as its public spokespersons complemented by its
paramount leader Somawansa Amarasinghe and its General Secretary Tilvin Silva
as its ideologues. Indeed, one of the MPS’ criticisms of the JVP is that its
leaders were created through their entry into elected bodies such as parliament,
and not through peoples’ movements.
The mainstream media was swift to describe the dissidents as
‘extremists’ and hint that they represented a throwback to the JVP’s armed
adventurism. The identity of one of their key leaders, Premakumar Gunarathnam,
was leaked to the media; and his Tamil ethnicity was used to throw mud at the
new formation, manifesting Sri Lanka’s racist political culture.
However, the MPS was able to win the loyalty of most of the bureaus of
the JVP (for e.g. student, education, publications etc.), as well as the
majority of its district structures aside from Anuradhapura, Hambantota and
Kurunegala. Also, many of the JVP’s overseas members, excepting perhaps in
Japan, have also joined the new formation.
The new party is evidently well-funded in comparison to other Left
parties. It has several full-timers and an efficient and disciplined
organisational structure. It is supporting the Janarala newspaper (edited by the team that previously published
the pro-JVP Irida Lanka weekly). It has organised several
public events in the last few months to consolidate its membership and explain
its differences with the JVP. It is able to mount posters island-wide and
within the space of a few hours, such as immediately following the recent abduction
of its leaders. Like the JVP it is able to count on the selflessness and
self-sacrifice of its cadres and sympathisers. Its overseas committees are also
critical to its income and in developing relations with fraternal organisations
abroad.
The JVP has the support of 3 of the 4 parliamentarians returned in 2010;
only Ajith Kumara representing Galle district has joined the FSP. It also has retained
the support of its trade unions and their membership. However, its peasant
front leader (and former member of parliament) S. K. Subasinghe has joined with
the dissidents. The JVP has also secured most of its assets including
headquarters and many district offices.
Partial Break
with JVP
Initially, the MPS aimed to gain leadership of the JVP and therefore it
has presented itself as the authentic or genuine inheritors of the legacy of
Rohana Wijeweera. So, last November on Wijeweera’s death anniversary that is
marked as ‘Heroes Day’, there were two commemorations of JVP martyrs (Il Maha Viru Samaruwa) by the different
factions.
Although it has engaged in self-criticism of its past (that was
distributed in book form at the inaugural convention), the new party has
focused its critique on the post-2004 record of the JVP, particularly its
support for the capitalist Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Therefore, it is still
unable to confront the adventurism of the JVP’s two abortive ‘revolutions’, as
well as the break from Marxism represented by Wijeweera’s position that the
Tamil plantation proletariat (of recent Indian origin) constituted a fifth
column of Indian expansionism; and his opposition to the Tamil liberation
struggle.
The split has already had a salutary effect on the JVP. In January 2010,
it supported the presidential campaign of former army commander Sarath Fonseka,
also backed by the United National Party and the Tamil National Alliance, and
formed a motley electoral front with him and his supporters (ranging from
disgruntled UNPers and SLFPers to military personnel) called the Democratic
National Alliance (DNA). This alliance is now dead as the JVP has accepted that
it was a mistake to ally itself with Fonseka and claims that it will not enter
into coalition agreements with pro-capitalist parties in future. Also, the JVP
has become more strident in its criticism of the militarisation of the
Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern provinces of the island and in highlighting
abuses of democratic and human rights in those regions.
While the FSP is critical of the JVP’s position on the Tamil national
question, its own perspective is still vague and ambiguous. It recognises the
existence of multiple nationalities in Sri Lanka, but does not advocate the
right to self-determination for oppressed nationalities. In fact its leaders
have said that they oppose “separatism and federalism” and will seek to
convince Tamils to “accept a solution which ensures equality and democracy to
them”.
We can agree that the existing 13th Amendment is not a
solution to the national question and that we need to transcend capitalism to
attack the roots of national oppression. However, as a beginning, does the FSP
accept the need for its full implementation including the controversial exercise
of powers over land allocation and police powers by provincial governments?
And, will it join the campaign for “13+”, that is, for power-sharing with
Tamils and other minorities and self-government in the North and East? This is
a thorny issue for the FSP partly because the JVP opposed the 13th
Amendment and killed leftists who (critically) supported the Indo-Lanka Accord
that introduced the constitutional reform during its second insurrection.
It is commendable that the MPS/FSP has not yielded to the prevailing
Sinhala nationalist ethos and has publicly declared that it is engaged in
dialogue with ex-LTTE combatants and willing to accept them into its ranks. The
government has unleashed a ferocious propaganda campaign against it for daring
to forge unity between the Sinhala and Tamil oppressed and to overcome the
mutual distrust and suspicion that has polarised the exploited and marginalised
of both peoples. However, the new party cannot take cover under the threadbare
position of the JVP that Tamils and other minorities must await ‘socialism’ for
the satisfaction of their democratic demands.
There also needs to be clarity on whether we mean the same thing by
‘socialism’ and the road to socialism. What is the relationship between
democracy and socialism? How do we entrench and assimilate democratic practices
within our own organisations and mass organisations? How should socialists work
within the workers movement when it is divided on party political lines? What
is the relationship between struggles against national oppression and struggles
for socialism?
For instance, the FSP’s inaugural convention appears to be modelled on
those of the JVP which are rallies of the faithful and not delegate-based
conferences where open debate takes place and the leadership is transparently
elected. Instead, the new leadership (an 18 member central committee) of the
FSP was announced at the Convention, having apparently been pre-selected by an
inner core membership. Subsequently, the central committee has elected Senadheera
Gunatilleke as its general secretary and G. Kularatne as its organising
secretary among its 9 member political council that also includes Premakumar
Gunarathnam and Dimuthu Attygala.
It is to the credit of the Frontline Socialist Party that since its
inception, it has been open to collaborate and dialogue with other political traditions.
This sharp break from the political practice of the JVP cannot be over-stated.
The JVP has always been a sectarian party that placed its self-interest over
those of the broader movement. It avoids engagement with the radical Left and
is unable to collaborate on joint campaigns even in the trade union and social movement.
The JVP only considers itself to be the genuine party of the Left. This has
isolated it and contributed to its political stagnation.
In contrast, the comrades of the FSP understand that the working class
is not homogeneous and that it will have diverse political tendencies. Therefore
the FSP recognises that there has to be a plurality of the Left in the
revolutionary movement and that the movement as a whole can only advance
through grasping and channelling the various experiences of its constituents.
The FSP has adopted the perspective that it does not claim to have all
the answers and neither does it claim to have had a spotless past. In that
spirit it has welcomed the participation of other groups in its Movement for
Peoples Struggle which it intends to continue as a broad front while building
its own party. This enlightened approach of the comrades of the FSP and the
respectful manner in which it has been in dialogue with the radical Left
including Trotskyist groups such as the NSSP, despite the hostility of the JVP
towards this political tradition, is what is most encouraging in what are bleak
and unfavourable times.
In addition to common campaigns such as around disappearances and
abductions, the current political dialogue should also take place at the base
of the radical Left and not be confined to its leadership in Colombo. The FSP
could open the pages of its newspaper, not only to promote greater
understanding within the Left, but also to overcome the crisis of credibility
of socialist ideas and politics. The NSSP has proposed to the FSP that it should
jointly organise its May Day celebration this year with other Left parties and
trade unions. Unitary initiatives such as these can be decisive steps towards
greater convergence on the Left and inspire hope among those in struggle today
and tomorrow.
The SWP appears to offer its members less, rather than
more, democracy when compared to many social and political institutions in
contemporary western capitalist societies, (or even the Bolshevik Party during
conditions of Tsarist repression in Russia)!
